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 Part of the Contracts Commons 
CONTRACT IS NOT PROMISE;  CONTRACT IS CONSENT
RANDY E BARNETT*
ABSTRACT: In the 1980s, Charles Fried was right to focus on what was missing from
both the “death of contract” and “law and economics” approaches to contract law: 
the internal morality of contract.  But he focused on the wrong morality.  Rather than
embodying the morality of promise-keeping, the enforcement of contracts can best
be explained and justified as a product of the parties’ consent to be legally bound. 
In this essay, I observe that, in Contract as Promise, Fried himself admits that the
“promise principle” cannot explain or justify two features that are at the core of
contract law:  the objective theory of assent and the content of most “gap fillers” or
default rules of contract law.  After summarizing how consent to contract accounts
for both, I explain that, whereas the morality of promise-keeping is best considered
within the realm of ethics — or private morality — legally enforcing the consent of
the parties is a requirement of justice — or public morality.
Charles Fried’s Contract as Promise  arrived on the scene in 1981 at exactly1
the right moment.  In the 1970s, contract law scholarship had come to be dominated
by two competing visions: the “contract as tort” vision associated with many
scholars, but most pithily by Grant Gilmore in his highly influential The Death of
Contract,  which appeared in 1974; and the “contract as efficiency” vision associated2
with law and economics scholars, especially that of the prolific and accessible
Richard Posner in his book The Economic Analysis of Law,  the first edition of which3
was published in 1973.  
Fried’s “contract as promise” thesis was a welcome and much-needed defense
of the traditional view of contract as protecting the “will” or choices of private
parties.  In it Fried defends what he calls “the promise principle,” by which he meant
“that principle by which persons may impose on themselves obligations where none
existed before.”  To make his case, Fried engaged in a tour de force march through
Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown University Law Center. This*
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the conundrums of contract doctrine, separating those doctrines that could be
defended as consistent with the best understanding of voluntary transactions, those
doctrines that could best be understood as resting on alternative justifications that
were consistent with the enforcement of voluntary transactions, and those doctrines
that should be rejected because they are neither.  
Perhaps due to Fried’s systematic examination of the disparate contract law
doctrines that so frustrate first year law students, for a work of serious contracts
scholarship, Contract as Promise has remained a remarkably popular book, even
some thirty years after its appearance.  And it also inspired a coterie of contracts
scholars, who took contract law after its publication, who have pursued and
elaborated the “contract as promise” model.
By coincidence, in the Fall of 1981, I began a one year fellowship at the
University of Chicago Law School after having served four years as a criminal
prosecutor for the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office in Chicago.  My research
agenda was to retool as a contracts scholar, having been inspired to do so by taking
Roberto Unger’s contract class at Harvard Law School in 1974-1975.  In his course,
the only time he ever taught Contracts, Unger had effectively critiqued the “liberal”
conception of contracts.  We read, among other things, Gilmore’s Death of
Contracts, and Unger provided his own unique take on contract law that has yet to
be published to this day.  And I later came to appreciate the extent to which Unger’s
critique of freedom of contract reflected that of Duncan Kennedy, who was then on
the rise as a legal theorist of the private law, but who taught Contracts in another
section.
As a law student sympathetic to freedom of contract, I found myself unable
to answer Unger’s challenge, but at the same time unwilling to accept his critique,
engaging as it was.  Also unsatisfied was Unger’s colleague (and my torts professor)
Charles Fried.  His answer to Unger and others was Contract as Promise.  But
Fried’s answer, while a great step forward, did not fully satisfy me.  With his
response in mind, I embarked on the writing that would lead to “a consent theory of
contract,” or what might be called “contract as consent.”
I confess that I have not read Contract as Promise from cover to cover since
my days at the University of Chicago.  As a scholar, one has a tendency not to
backtrack, which is why teaching is so valuable.  It forces scholars to read, and
reread, all the seminal cases and materials one might well never review.  And that
compels scholars to see these classic materials in a new light with each passing year. 
I accepted the invitation to participate in this symposium not only as an opportunity
to pay homage to my professor Charles Fried, but as an inducement to revisit
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Contract as Promise to appreciate why it has endured so well for thirty years.
What I found upon my rereading was a book that exceeded my recollection
of it.  Not only does Fried’s account of contract doctrine still seem fresh and
insightful.  It turns out that in several respects, he anticipated “contract as consent.” 
Indeed, I can imagine that, if one changed its opening thesis from “contract as
promise” to “contract as consent,” much of the subsequent thesis could remain more
or less intact, albeit with some important modifications and improvements.  
In particular, one of the less satisfying aspects of Contract as Promise, and
the reason it left me rather cold when it first appeared, is how willing it appears to so
quickly shift away from the promise model to account for myriad doctrines.  True,
it claims that this shift does not undermine the promise principle.  But it also insists
that the promise principle does not account for many of the doctrines that are needed
to supplement it.  One comes away from the book, or at least I came away from the
book, thinking that Fried opts for alternative principles on a seeming ad-hoc basis. 
Or at least, that the promise principle on its own appears unable to justify much of
what he himself thinks of as justified contracts doctrine.
In my view, “contract as consent” explains and justifies far more of contract
law doctrine than does “contract as promise.”  And it avoids some of the problems
created by viewing promises as the core of contractual obligation.  But because
consent and promise are so close to each other — and both ground contractual
obligations in the voluntary choices of contracting parties — it is hard for some to
distinguish these two alternative defenses of contractual freedom.
In these remarks, I will not be able to mount a comprehensive critique of
either “contract as promise” or Contract as Promise.  Instead, I want to briefly
summarize some of the difficulties of this model and describe how it differs from
contract as consent.  But I also want to do one more thing I had not expected to do
when I accepted the invitation to participate in this symposium.  I wish to highlight
the degree to which Fried’s defense of “contract as promise” actually relies on
arguments that are better understood as aspects of “contract as consent.”  In this
regard, his instincts moved him in the direction of consent, even when his theory was
ostensibly limited to promise.   And his defense of contractual freedom was, I think,
as a result, more powerful than it otherwise would have been.
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I.  CONTRACT IS NOT PROMISE
The thesis of Contract as Promise presents three major difficulties that
undercut its claim to be either an explanation or justification for contract law.  These
concern (1) its inability to explain contract law’s objective theory of assent as
contractual, (2) its inability to understand contract law’s “gap fillers” as contractual,
and (3) its moralizing the enforcement of contracts in the wrong way.  In this Part,
I consider each in turn.
The Problem of the Objective Theory of Assent.  In my 1986 article, A
Consent Theory of Contract,  I presented a critique of “will theories” of contract that4
can also be taken as a critique of Fried’s “contract as promise” thesis as well.  Later,
I refer to the “will principle” rather than will “theories,”  but I might just have well5
have called it the “promise principle” instead.  According to the will or promise
principle, commitments are enforceable because the promisor has “willed” or freely
chosen to be bound by his commitment.  Under the classical view, “the law of
contract gives expression to and protects the will of the parties, for the will is
something inherently worthy of respect.”   In this approach, the use of force against6
a reneging promisor is morally justified because the promisor herself has undertaken
the obligation in question.  A promisor cannot complain about force being used
against her, since she created the obligation being enforced.  Or, as Fried puts it: “An
individual is morally bound to keep his promises because he has intentionally
invoked a convention whose function it is to give grounds — moral grounds — for
another to expect the promised performance.”   7
In this way, the will (or promise) principle is able to distinguish contract from
tort.  In tort, the source of the obligation or “duty” is the law.  In contract, the source
of the obligation or duty being enforced is the promisor herself.  The spirit of the will
principle may best be exemplified by the traditional sentiment, often expressed by
Nineteenth and early Twentieth century courts, that contracts require a “meeting of
the minds.”  That mutual “assent” is thought necessary to create a contractual
Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986).  The next4
several paragraphs are based on id. at 272-74.
See RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 586 (4  ed. 2008).5 th
Morris Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 575 (1933).6
See FRIED, supra note 1, at 16 (emphasis added).7
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obligation is quite harmonious with the will principle.
For its moral force, the promise principle depends upon the notion that
contractual duties are binding because they are freely assumed by those who are
required to discharge them.  This position leads quite naturally to an inquiry as to the
promisor’s actual state of mind at the time of agreement — the so-called “subjective”
viewpoint — and indeed most important contractual duties probably are subjectively
assented to by the promisor.  However, what of those manifested commitments that
lack subjective assent?  Without a genuine commitment by the person who is to be
subjected to a legal sanction, enforcement would seem to be unjustified by the “will”
of the promisee and, hence, it seems unsupported by the promise principle.  After all,
enforcement can hardly be based on either will or promise if the obligation was not
chosen by the individual but instead was imposed by law the way that tort duties are.
Yet, it has long been recognized that a system of contractual enforcement
would be unworkable if it required a subjective inquiry into the putative promisor’s
intent.  Where we cannot discern the actual subjective intent or will of the parties,
there is no practical problem since we may assume it corresponds to objectively
manifested intentions.  But where subjective intent can somehow be proved and it is
contrary to objectively manifested behavior, the subjective intent should prevail if the
moral integrity of the will principle is to be preserved.
Of course, any legal preference for the promisor’s hidden subjective intent
would disappoint a promisee who has acted in reliance on the appearance of a
commitment.  Moreover, permitting a subjective inquiry into the promisor’s intent
could also enable a promisor to fraudulently undermine otherwise perfectly clear
agreements by generating and preserving extrinsic evidence of ambiguous or
conflicting intentions. Such a strategy might create a de facto option in the promisor. 
The promisor could insist on enforcement if the contract continued to be in her
interest, but if it were no longer advantageous, she could avoid the contract by
producing evidence of a differing subjective intent.   In sum, because the subjective8
approach relies on evidence inaccessible to the promisee, much less to third parties,
an inquiry into subjective intent would undermine the security of transactions by
greatly reducing the reliability of contractual commitments.  As philosopher David
Hume, upon whom Fried relies,  observed over two hundred years ago:9
For a case in which a court suspected a party of using the “mail-box rule” in such a fashion,8
see Cohen v. Clayton Coal Company, 86 Colo. 270, 281 p. 111 (1929).
See e.g. FRIED , supra note 1, at 1, 15, 137, 138, 150-51.9
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If the secret direction of the intention, said every man of sense, could invalidate a
contract, where is our security?  And yet a metaphysical schoolman might think, that
where an intention was supposed to be requisite, if that intention really had no place,
no consequence ought to follow, and no obligation be imposed.   10
Not surprisingly, despite the oft-expressed traditional sentiment that contracts require
a “meeting of the minds,” the objective approach has largely prevailed.  A rigorous
commitment to a will theory conflicts unavoidably with the practical need for a
system of rules based to a large extent on objectively manifested states of mind.  So
too does the promise principle for the same reasons, unless it is qualified in some
manner.  
Of course, because a person’s objective manifestations generally do reflect
her subjective intentions, the doctrinal requirement of mutual assent tends in the vast
majority of cases to honor the promise principle.  And, consistent with the these
principles, (a) the reasonable or objective meaning of assent may be overridden by
proof of a contrary subjective agreement between both parties, and (b) when a
promisee has access to the subjective or actual understanding of the promisor, he may
not rely on the “objective” or reasonable meaning of the promisor’s conduct.  In such
circumstances, the courts will enforce the subjective over the objective meaning of
assent.  
Nonetheless, the promise principle has difficulty explaining the enforcement
of the objective agreement where it can be shown that the subjective understanding
of a promisor differs from her objectively manifested behavior.  Fried sees this all-
too-clearly but, with typical candor, he goes the other way: “Another of the classical
law’s evasions of the inevitability of using noncontractual principles to resolve
failures of agreement is recourse to the so-called objective standard of
interpretation.”   11
In short, Fried thinks that the objective approach to contract cannot be
justified by the promise principle.  “In the face of a claim of divergent intentions, the
court imagines that it is respecting the will of the parties by asking what somebody
else, say the ordinary person, would have intended by such words of agreement.”  12
Instead, such an approach entails “imposing an external standard on the parties”
DAVID HUM E, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 30 n. 5 (C. Hendel10
ed. 1957) (1st ed. 1751).
FRIED, supra note 1, at 61.11
Id.12
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based on “nonpromissory standards of justice.”   However, if contract equals13
promise, and promise cannot justify this mainstay of contract law doctrine as
“contractual,” this is a major weakness of contract as promise.  Contract as promise
may not have been refuted, but this is strike one.
The Problem of “Gap Filling.”  A second serious problem is created by the
promise theory’s exclusive focus on promises once it is conceded, as it must be, that
many real-world contract law problems arise precisely because parties have
unavoidably left “gaps” in their promises. This has led some contracts theorists to
argue that other nonpromissory principles must be used to determine the “gap-filling”
rules of contract law.  In Contract as Promise, Fried takes exactly this position. 14
Where gaps exist in a contract, “the court is forced to sort out the difficulties that
result when parties think they have agreed but actually have not. The one basis on
which these cases cannot be resolved is on the basis of the agreement — that is, of
contract as promise.”   In his analysis of the inevitable “gap-filling” that contract law15
provides, he readily concedes that the “gaps cannot be filled, the adjustments cannot
be governed, by the promise principle.”   When combined with its inability to justify16
the objective approach to contract, this inability to “fill gaps” is strike two for
contract as promise. 
The Problem of Moralizing Contract.  But there is one more problem that
goes to the very heart of Contract as Promise: the claim that the obligation to keep
one’s promises is a moral one.
An individual is morally bound to keep his promises because he has intentionally
invoked a convention whose function it is to give grounds — moral grounds — for
another to expect the promised performance. To renege is to abuse a confidence he
was free to invite or not, and which he intentionally did invite. To abuse that
confidence now is like (but only like) lying: the abuse of a shared social institution
that is intended to invoke the bonds of trust.  17
Id.13
See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 7814
VA. L. REV. 821, 822-23 (1992).
FRIED , supra note 1, at 60.15
Id. at 69.16
Id at 16 (footnote omitted).17
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Recently, Fried has explained what he means by “morality,” saying that
“[m]orality is concerned with how people should lead their lives and how they should
treat each other.”   And he further elaborated:18
Morality . . .  condemns a way of life indifferent to the well being of others, and
even more strongly condemns pursuits that are constituted by the frustration,
humiliation, or destruction of others.  By contrast, it enjoins each actor to respect
the other’s humanity—that is, the feeling, judging, and striving nature of other
persons—and celebrates pursuits that involve others not only without disrespecting
them (that is, “using” them in Kantian terminology), but also by furthering their own
pursuits as they further the actor’s pursuit.  19
But basing contracts on this capacious conception of morality invites courts
to inquire into the moral merits of the respective parties.   Indeed, by justifying20
contract as a species of enforcing purely moral commitments, it seems tantamount
to enforcing virtue.  Such an open-ended rationale leads to serious problems for the21
value of freedom of contract that Fried is defending in Contract as Promise. First, it
Charles Fried, The Convergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 1, __18
(2007).
Id. at __.19
See e.g. Seana Shiffren, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708,20
725 (2007) (“[W]hether it is morally wrong for the promisee to refuse [to mitigate] may depend on
a number of factors to which the law is insensitive, including the closeness of the relationship, the
history of the relationship, the reason for breach, the reason the promisor wants to shift the burden,
and how cumbersome mitigation activities would be.”); and id., Could Breach of Contract be
Immoral? 107 MICH. L. REV. 1551, 1567 (2009) (“I am not arguing that breach of contract is always
immoral, just that it may sometimes be.  Nothing I have argued precludes the judgment that some
forms of breach are morally permissible.”)
But see id. at 752 (denying that contract law is “an effort to get people to act virtuously, to21
prompt people to keep their promises for the right reasons, to ensure that private relationships go as
well as possible, or to get people to make promises when morally appropriate to do so.”) According
to Shiffren, contract law “is not an effort to legalize as much as possible the interpersonal moral
regime of promising, but rather to provide support for the political and public values associated with
promising.”  Id.  I view this effort by Shiffren to distinguish the morality of contract that is the core
of her approach from enforcing virtue as reintroducing into her analysis the distinction I make below
between “public” and “private” morality.
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commits courts to enforcing promissory commitments that the parties themselves
may never have contemplated as “contractual” or legally enforceable, thereby
undermining the value of freedom from contract. Second, once the moral behavior
of the promissor is deemed relevant to the issue of enforceability, the promise theory
also appears to make relevant to the issue of enforcement other moral aspects of the
promisor’s behavior that may argue against enforcement, thereby undermining the
value of freedom to contract. In this manner, the common-law rights of contract can
come to resemble the judicial discretion of a court of equity.
Those unsympathetic to freedom of contract will not be bothered by the
implication of moralizing contract in this way.  But Fried himself wrote Contract as
Promise as a way to defend contractual freedom.  “[T]he law of contracts facilitates
our disposing of [our] rights on terms that seem best to us.”   For those who share22
this view, this problem with contract as promise should be considered strike three.
II.  CONTRACT IS CONSENT
I do not intend to rehearse all the reasons I have previously advanced for why
the overarching organizing principle of contract is not promise, but consent.  My
recent book, Contracts,  explains how and why discerning the existence and23
meaning of that consent comprises the core of the law of contract.  Whereas the
duties enforced by torts may or may not be a product of the consent of the person on
whom they are imposed, every contract begins with the consent of the parties. 
I shall only briefly describe here the criterion of contractual enforceability that
I have elaborated elsewhere over the past twenty-five years.   It is a criterion that is24
FRIED , supra note 1, at 2.22
See RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW (2010).23
In a real sense, Contracts is my answer both to Fried’s Contract as Promise and to Gilmore’s The
Death of Contracts, although its survey of the principal doctrines of contract law resembles the former
more than the latter.  
In addition to BARNETT, supra note 23, see Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form24
Contracts, 71 FORDHAM  L. REV. 627 (2002); id.  . . . and Contractual Consent, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L. J. 421 (1993); id., Rational Bargaining Theory and Contract: Default Rules, Hypothetical Consent,
the Duty to Disclose, and Fraud, 15 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 783 (1992); id., supra note 14; id.,
Conflicting Visions: A Critique of Ian Macneil's Relational Theory of Contract, 78 VA. L. REV. 1175
(1992); id., The Function of Several Property and Freedom of Contract, 9 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 62
(1992); id., Some Problems With Contract as Promise, 77 CORN. L. REV. 1022 (1992); id., The
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explicitly acknowledged in English law and which I think underlies much of the
doctrine of contract law we have inherited: courts should presumptively enforce
private commitments when there exists a manifested intention to create a legal
relation.  Another formulation of this approach is that, to determine the prima facie
case of contract, we should determine whether there was a manifested intention to be
legally bound.   I refer to this criterion, in short, as consent.  
This special sense of “consent” is to be distinguished from promise.  To
promise is to commit to do or refrain from doing something.  To consent to contract
is to commit to be legally responsible for nonperformance of a promise.  So consent
is a commitment in addition to whatever moral commitment inheres in a promise.  
Moreover, contractual consent is to be distinguished from subjective assent. 
Consent is the voluntary communication by one person to another person of a
particular message: that one intends to alter an already existing legal relation between
the parties or to create a new one.   Some such criterion seems to have been25
incorporated into U.C.C. § 2-204(3), which permits the enforcement of a contract
with one or more open terms “if the parties intended to make a contract and there is
a reasonably certain basis of giving an appropriate remedy.”26
A “consent theory” of contractual enforcement provides a general criterion
of contractual enforceability that strikes a reasonable and workable balance among
the party-based, substance-based and process principles that comprise the core
concerns of contract.  Requiring a manifested intention to be legally bound facilitates
the will or private autonomy of the parties, since one’s manifested intention is highly
likely to reflect an underlying subjective assent.  The existence of a manifested
intention to be legally bound also helps distinguish those commitments upon which
Internal and External Analysis of Concepts, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 525 (1990); id. Squaring
Undisclosed Agency Law With Contract Theory, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1969 (1987); id, supra note 4; id.,
Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 179 (1986)[hereinafter cited as
“Inalienable Rights”]; id. Contract Scholarship and The Reemergence of Legal Philosophy (book
review), 97 HARV. L. REV. 1223 (1984); and Randy E. Barnett & Mary Becker, Beyond Reliance:
Promissory Estoppel, Contract Formalities and Misrepresentation, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 445 (1987). 
The next several paragraphs are based on BARNETT, supra note 5, at 602-04.
Because every person stands in some legal relation to every other person, analytically there25
is no real difference between altering a pre-existing legal relationship and creating a new one.  Still,
it is useful to distinguish between creating a contractual relationship between parties who previously
had no such relationship and altering a contractual relationship that already exists.
UNIFORM  COM M ERCIAL CODE § 2-204(3).26
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reliance is justified and merits legal protection from those that do not.  Although
restitution-based liability is not limited to contract — it can provide an independent
basis for legal enforcement apart from consent — the existence of a party’s consent
to be legally bound justifies forcing that party to disgorge her enrichment.
Adherence to a criterion of consent would tend to limit enforceability to
value-enhancing or efficient commitments (whether gratuitous or as part of an
exchange) in which, ex ante, the parties view enforceability to be worth more to them
than its costs.  To the extent that parties themselves are normally the best judge of
their own interests, the substance of agreements that result from the parties’ consent
are also likely to be fair.  But to the extent that normal conditions do not obtain, the
parties’ consent provides only a prima facie basis for enforceability.  Contract
defenses that allow consent to be set aside under circumstances such as fraud, duress,
various forms of incompetence, undue influence, etc. identify circumstances where
the consent of the parties may not produce substantively fair or efficient agreements.
Finally, the criterion of consent helps place the bargain principle in proper
perspective.  The existence of a bargain in a commercial context is very likely to
indicate the existence of an intention to be legally bound.  The absence of bargains
in noncommercial settings is apt to reflect the absence of such consent.  Nonetheless,
the existence of a bargain is not dispositive of the issue of consent.  For example, the
presence of a bargain in the commercial context could be negated by evidence that
the parties did not intend to be legally bound.  By the same token, the absence of a
bargain in the noncommercial context could be compensated by the existence of
some other indicia of intention to be legally bound — perhaps a formality such as so-
called “nominal consideration.”  
Furthermore, in many promissory estoppel cases, some indicia of consent
other than bargain appears to be present.  So we may be wrong to conceive of the
doctrine of promissory estoppel solely in terms of reliance.  And under some
circumstances, consent of a promisor to be legally bound may be manifested by her
silence in the face of substantial reliance by the promisee of the sort that would not
be incurred without a commitment to be legally bound.
Like any rule of law, however, limiting even prima facie contractual
enforcement to those commitments that are accompanied by some formal or informal
manifestation of intention to be legally bound will lead to some cases of over- and
underenforcement from the standpoint of the underlying principles of will, reliance,
fairness, restitution, and efficiency.  On the one hand, if limited to highly formalized
manifestations of consent, it will fail to capture all promises that intuitions deem to
be enforceable.  On the other hand, if expanded to include highly contextual indicia
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of consent such as those just discussed, it may lead to the enforcement of some
commitments that should be left unenforced.  Moreover, standing alone, consent to
be legally bound does not immediately explain the limitations on its application, for
example, in cases involving promises to perform illegal acts or consent to servitude.  27
Finally, although the consent criterion accounts for much of existing contract
doctrine, this “fit” alone does not entirely justify a conclusion that it should be the
sole criterion of contractual obligation.28
My purpose here is simply to compare “contract as promise” with “contract
as consent.”   In particular, contract as consent better explains and justifies the
objective theory of assent and the default rules that comprise the bulk of contract law. 
The Objective Theory of Assent.   The law of contracts, property, and torts29
can be viewed as defining boundaries within which each person may make her own
choices in pursuit of her own happiness.   You are allowed to do what you wish with
what is yours (as defined by property law), provided that you do not infringe (as
defined by tort law) on the property of others — including the inalienable property
rights one has in one’s own body.  Contract law provides the means by which a
person can transfer her property to another by her consent (although wholly
gratuitous transfers are considered to be an aspect of property law, not contracts). 
So contract, property, and torts — along with other subjects such as
restitution — can be viewed as providing the legal boundaries that define the scope
of individual liberty and distinguish rightful from wrongful conduct.  To act
rightfully is to remain within one’s boundaries; wrongful conduct is when one
crosses over into another’s rightful domain.  These “boundaries” do not presuppose
an atomistic individualism in which each person is an island.  Contract, property, and
torts are thoroughly relational or social.  They address the fact that each person’s
actions can potentially affect others by distinguishing those actions that are
nevertheless permissible from those that are not.  In a world of atomistic individuals
— or Robinson Crusoes on desert islands — no such concepts would be needed. 
My treatment of this subject examines the underlying entitlements that parties bring to27
transactions and which are transferred by their consent.  Because some of these entitlements are
inalienable, they cannot be transferred even with the consent of the parties.  See Barnett, Inalienable
Rights, supra note 24.
For additional normative support of the consent criterion, see BARNETT, supra note 23, at28
127-47.
This section is drawn from id. at 72-74.29
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Fried agrees with this.  “The law of property defines the boundaries of our
rightful possessions, while the law of torts seeks to make us whole against violations
of those boundaries, as well as against violations of the natural boundaries of our
physical person.”   And contract?  “[T]he law of contracts facilitates our disposing30
of these rights on terms that seem best to us.”   So far so good.  But this analysis31
leads not to enforcing our promises per se, but to enforcing consensual exchanges of
entitlements — and an objective theory of contract, modified by a “subjective twist.”
If the law is doing its boundary-defining job, each person should know, or be
able to find out, what physical resources belong to her for her use, and what belongs
to others, as well as how to use what is hers without interfering with the like rights
of others.  In this way, the existence of these legal boundaries, or limits on the scope
of rightful conduct, provides vital information to all those who might wish to avoid
disputes and respect the rights of others, provided they know what those rights are.
Potential conflicts between persons who might otherwise vie for control of a given
resource are thus avoided, and society as a whole is rendered more harmonious.
In contract law, this informational or “boundary-defining” function is served
by requiring that consent to alienate or transfer one’s rights must be manifested by
one party to the other in a manner that provides a criterion of enforcement. Without
a manifestation of assent that is accessible to all affected parties, the law will have
failed to identify clearly and communicate to both parties (and to third parties) the
rightful boundaries that must be respected. Without such communication, parties to
a transaction (and third parties) cannot accurately ascertain what constitutes rightful
conduct and what constitutes a commitment on which they can rely. Disputes that
might otherwise have been avoided will occur, and the attendant uncertainties of the
transfer process will discourage beneficial reliance.
Although requiring the consent of one party to alienate or transfer her rights
to another is essential to achieve the boundary-defining function of law, whether one
has consented to a transfer of rights generally depends not on one’s subjective
opinion about the meaning of one’s freely chosen words or conduct, but on the
ordinary meaning that is attached to them. If the word “yes” ordinarily means yes,
then a subjective and unrevealed belief that “yes” means no is generally immaterial.
Only a general reliance on objectively ascertainable assertive conduct will enable a
FRIED, supra note 1, at 1-2.  He provides a nice concise defense of property rights id. at30
100-01.
Id. at 2.31
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legal system to perform its boundary-defining function.  
 It is true that, because one of the core concerns of contract is that the actual
or inner subjective welfare of each party be increased,  contracts are interpreted with32
an eye towards honoring the actual intentions of the parties.  In the main, genuinely
consensual exchanges are value enhancing.  Because we cannot read each other’s
minds, however, only the “reasonable” or objective interpretation of the commitment
will establish the clear boundaries that are required for persons to pursue happiness
without interfering in the like pursuit by others of their happiness.  
On the other hand, the “objective” approach to assent incorporates a
subjective twist.  Before one party may rely on the “objective” assent of another, that
party must have subjectively understood the other party to have intended that
meaning and actually relied upon it.   And, when it comes to discerning the meaning33
of the parties’ agreement, where both parties subjectively agree on an idiosyncratic
meaning — or when one party is subjectively aware of the idiosyncratic meaning
held by the other — the idiosyncratic meaning will trump that of the reasonable
person.   34
There is nothing novel or revolutionary about contract law’s concern for the
protection of reliance by one contracting party on the commitment of the other. One
of the most important functions of the institution of property rights is to legally
protect certain expectations of the rights holder so that she may rely on the continued
use of certain resources. For example, an owner of land relies upon her title when she
invests in building a house or a factory upon it, because she expects that her title will
be honored by a legal system in the future. She also relies upon her title when she
leaves town on vacation, expecting her property to still be hers when she returns.
The alleged conflict in contracts between “will” and “reliance” results from
focusing on one party to a transaction or the other.  But, like property, the boundary-
defining aspect of contract defines and regulates the relations between persons. 
Basing the prima facie case of contractual obligation on the manifestation of consent
to be legally bound facilitates this relational quality of contract law.
See BARNETT, supra, note 23 at xix-xxi (discussing the three core concerns of contract law).32
See id. at 71-72.33
See id. at 85-86.34
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  From Gap-Filling to Default Rules.   As was seen in Part I, because he35
equates contract with promise, Fried concludes that an appeal to extracontractual
considerations becomes necessary when “gaps” arise in one’s promise.  This stance
stemmed not only from his commitment to contract as promise, but also from the
“gap-filling” conception of contract law that was regnant when he wrote.  
For a long time, many of the rules of contract law were called “gap fillers,”
which emphasized that they applied precisely when the agreement — or promises —
of the parties did not address the issue governed by the rule.  In short, the rules of
contract law applied when there was a “gap” in the assent of the parties.  By adopting
this terminology, the consent of the parties could be cast as irrelevant to contract law
because contract law applied precisely when the consent of the parties did not exist.
As we saw, this led Fried to conclude that much of contract law itself, not being
based on the promises of the parties, was noncontractual.
Since Contract as Promise appeared, however, this “gap-filling” image of
contract law has been supplanted to a great extent by the image of contract law as
“default rules.” The default rules of contract law are like the default margins supplied
by your word processing program that apply unless you change them.  As such, the
rules of contract law apply unless the parties “contract around” them by putting a
different term in their agreement.  Although there are some contract law doctrines
that cannot be contracted around, the great majority of contract law rules are default
rules.  Indeed, most of the cases studied in contracts courses would not be included
had the parties only inserted an express clause to cover the issue that later arose.
Whereas the image of “gap fillers” emphasized the discontinuity between
contract law and the consent of the parties, the concept of default rules highlights an
intimate connection between contract and consent.  Notwithstanding that the rules of
contract law are provided by the courts or legislature rather than by the parties, under
certain circumstances, the parties can be said to have consented to the application of
those background rules by remaining silent and accepting their operation.  
Some have maintained that the cost of contracting should be reduced by
applying contract law rules that most parties would agree to, placing the onus on the
minority of dissenting parties to expressly contract around the rules.  While this may
sometimes be a good way of selecting contract law rules, other considerations may
also be taken into account.  In particular, the background default rules can be chosen
to reduce misunderstandings about the terms that will actually apply in the event of
This section is based on id. at xxi-xxii & 99-100.  For a much more extensive account of35
default rules and consent, see Barnett, supra note 14.
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a dispute, even if that means applying default rules that all, or nearly all, parties
expressly contract around.  When this is the case, far from being inimical to consent,
the law of contract is greatly influenced by the goal of increasing the likelihood that
both parties are consenting to the same thing.
So far as freedom of contract is concerned, it sometimes does not matter what
the “gap filling” default rule is, so long as the parties had access to it.  It is rational
for repeat players (or one-shot players in large transactions) to learn the content of
the default rules via their lawyers.  By remaining silent they have consented to
whatever term the law supplies as a gap-filler and the conflict between freedom from
and freedom to is ameliorated. Such parties who do not contract around these default
rules can realistically be said to have objectively manifested their consent to them.
But the default rules supplied by contract law will also apply when one or
both parties are “rationally ignorant.” It is rational to remain ignorant of the
background rules of contract law when the cost of finding out the background rules
that will be supplied by a court, for example by hiring a lawyer, is greater than the
risk of agreeing to an undesired term.  When this is the case, as it often is for one-
shot players in low stakes contracts, if courts supply a term that rationally ignorant
parties would expect, the agreement is likely to be consistent with their consent. 
For this reason, contract law should confine itself to common sense default
rules that unsophisticated parties would expect.  When both parties are one-shot,
rationally-ignorant players, a common-sense default rule will likely reflect their tacit
intentions.  Repeat players who do not like the default rule are free to contract around
it by inserting an express clause to the contrary in the agreement.  By so doing, they
will put the rationally ignorant party on notice that the term actually governing the
transaction is not one that it would ordinarily expect, so they can decide whether to
accept or reject the agreement with this unexpected term in mind.  
In this way, default rules reflecting the conventional understanding of the less
sophisticated party will induce contracting behavior by repeat players that will
minimize latent subjective disagreements, and thereby reduce the likelihood that the
court will inadvertently impose upon the parties a term they did not expect, and to
which it cannot be said they objectively consented.
Fried anticipated much of this analysis of the role of conventions in filling
gaps.  “Since actual intent is (by hypothesis) missing, a court respects the autonomy
of the parties so far as possible by construing an allocation of burdens and benefits
that reasonable persons would have made in this kind of arrangements.”   He then36
FRIED, supra note 1, at 73 (emphasis added).36
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immediately says this “treats the contract as a kind of charter or constitution for the
parties’ relation.”   Had he not been blinded by his vision of contract as promise, he37
could have seen the next step: consent to the “charter or constitution” of the parties
is simply consent to contract!  
Yet his commitment to contract as promise leads Fried to shrink from this
conclusion.  After asserting that “contractual accidents occur precisely because no
mutual engagements have been made,” he concludes that contract law constructs “a
kind of nonconsensual penumbra” around the “consensual core.”   And how does it38
construct this penumbra?  “Obviously some standard of sharing external to the
intention of the parties must control.”   By his account then, this standard is outside39
of contract as promise, and therefore outside contract.
But “contractual accidents” not covered by express agreements fill the pages
of every contracts casebook.  Indeed, very few of the classic cases of contract law
would have existed had the parties expressly anticipated what precisely occurred.  In
effect, Fried must consider most of the actual law of contract to be noncontractural
because it is not based on promise.  He must abandon much of contract law to
noncontractual considerations.  This cannot be right.
Had the concept of default rules been available when he wrote, Fried might
have been tempted to claim that the content of default rules are imported into the tacit
understandings that surround an express promise.  This would not have solved his
basic problem, however, unless he conceded that there was not one, but two
“promises”: the promise to perform, and the promise to be bound by the default rules
supplied by the law of contract.  This second commitment is not really a promise; it
is simply the consent to be legally bound.
That consent to be legally bound is not a second “promise” was understood
by Samuel Williston, the father of the modern promise theory of contract that, thanks
to him, was embodied in the Restatement of Contracts.  Williston made exactly this
point when defending his proposed Uniform Written Obligations Act that would
enforce a written promise without bargained-for consideration “if the writing also
contains an additional express statement, in any form of language, that the signer
Id.37
Id. at 72.  Notice the use of “consensual” and “nonconsensual.”38
Id.39
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intends to be legally bound.”   40
When asked by a commissioner whether, under Williston’s proposal, “an
express promise . . . would need another express promise to be added to it,” he
replied: “Another express statement that you intend to be legally bound.  That is not
another express promise, but a statement that you intend your promise not simply to
create the moral obligation which attaches to every promise, but you intend that it
shall create a legal obligation.”   Although not a promise, such a statement would41
be a manifestation of intention to be legally bound or what I call “consent.”
Because it explains and justifies as contractual both the objective theory of
contract along with its subjective twist, and the bulk of the default rules supplied by
the law of contract, contract as consent is superior to contract as promise.  And,
though Fried was right to shift our focus to moral concerns, his focus on contract as
promise is problematic because it invites importing considerations of morality or
virtue into the interpersonal law of contracts.  This is because Fried mistakenly
focused on what might be called “private” as opposed to “public” considerations of
morality.
Uniform Written Obligation Act §1.40
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COM M ISSIONERS ON UNIFORM  STATE LAWS41
& PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING, Detroit, Michigan, Seventh Session, Friday,
August 28, 1925, as it appears in BARNETT, supra note 5, at 703.
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III.  THE PUBLIC MORALITY OF CONTRACT
The importance of “contract as consent” as opposed to “contract as promise”
has come to be recognized by a new generation of contract scholars each of whom
have questioned the model of contract as promise.  I am thinking of such writers as
Aditi Bagchi,  Andrew Gold,  Dori Kimel,  and my colleague Greg Klass.   I do42 43 44 45
not claim that each of these writers adopts what I call “a consent theory of contract”
in toto.  To the contrary, each has been critical of aspects of my approach.  But each
has also expressed grave skepticism of the “contract as promise” model and
sympathy for a consent-based alternative to it.  These scholars do not deny that there
is a morality of contract, but insist it is not the same morality as promise. 
Charles Fried was entirely correct to notice something missing from the “law
and economics” and “death of contracts” models of contract in vogue when he wrote
Contract as Promise.  And that something could be called “morality.”  But
“morality” is ambiguous insofar as it has more than one aspect.  And the morality of
promise-keeping is neither the only nor the best conception of morality to explain
contractual obligation and distinguish contract from tort. 
One way to express this is to distinguish “private” from “public” morality. 
Private morality governs the way one ought to live one’s life.  It identifies the duties
one owes to oneself and to others.  The term “ethics” perhaps best describes this
moral domain.  In contrast, public morality defines when coercion may be justifiably
used against an individual for breaching a duty.  The term “justice” best describes
this moral domain.  The old distinction between “perfect” and “imperfect” rights and
See Aditi Bagchi, Separating Contract and Promise, FLORIDA ST. L. REV. (forthcoming)42
(“It is appropriate to ask whether a party spoke and acted in a way that made it reasonable for the other
party to believe that she intended to be bound. But the inquiry cannot end there.”).
See Andrew S. Gold, A Property Theory of Contract 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 61-62 (2009)43
(“A promisor’s consent is necessary to a contractual obligation. However, contractual promises also
depend on the acts of the promisee, and it is this feature that makes contracts binding.”)
See DORI KIM EL, FROM PROM ISE TO CONTRACT: TOWARDS A LIBERAL THEORY OF44
CONTRACTS 136-42 (2005) (discussing “intention to create contractual relations”).
See Gregory Klass, Intent to Contract, 95 VA. L. REV. 1437 (2009) (examining doctrinal45
rules as reflecting in various ways the parties’ intentions to be legally bound).
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duties also captures these two moralities.  Perfect rights  — as in “I have a perfect46
right to that” —and perfect duties are enforceable; imperfect rights and duties are
unenforceable and rely on suasion.
Lon Fuller offered a similar distinction between the “morality of aspiration”
and the “morality of duty.”  The “morality of aspiration . . . is the morality of the
Good Life, of excellence, of the fullest realization of human powers.”   In contrast,47
the “morality of duty” provides “the basic rules without which an ordered society is
impossible, or without which an ordered society directed toward certain specific
goals must fail of its mark.”   The morality of duty “does not condemn men for48
failing to embrace opportunities for the fullest realization of their powers. Instead,
it condemns them for failing to respect the basic requirements of social living.”  49
With respect to each other, “[w]here the morality of aspiration starts at the top of
human achievement, the morality of duty starts at the bottom.”50
Fried himself once offered a metaphor that distinguished between the realm
of “philosophy” and the domain of “law.”  Philosophy proposes “an elaborate
structure of arguments and considerations that descend from on high but stop some
twenty feet above the ground.”   In contrast, “[i]t is the peculiar task of the law to51
complete this structure of ideals and values, to bring it down to earth; and to
complete it so that it is firmly and concretely seated, so that it shelters real human
beings against the storms of passion and conflict.”  
According to Fried, “[t]he law is really an independent, distinct part of the
structure of value.”  According to Fried, “[t]he lofty philosophical edifice does not
determine what the last twenty feet are, yet if the legal foundation is to support the
whole, then ideals and values must constrain, limit, inform, and inspire the
See e.g. ADAM  SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 5 (Oxford ed., 1978) (Liberty Press46
reprint 1982) (“The end proposed by justice is the maintaining men in what are called their perfect
rights”).
LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 5 (Rev. Ed. 1964).47
Id. at 5-648
Id. at 649
Id. at 5.50
Charles Fried, Rights and the Common Law, in UTILITY AND RIGHTS 231 (R.G. Frey ed.51
1984).
RANDY E. BARNETT CONTRACT IS NOT PROMISE PAGE 21
foundation—but no more.”  On this account, if the institution “promise” lies within
the realm of philosophy, as it clearly seems to in Contract as Promise, then Fried’s
metaphor instructs that it is “independent” from and “does not determine” what 
constitutes the actual law of contract.  
Viewed this way, the private morality of promise resides in the realm of ethics
or what Fried calls “philosophy.”  In contrast, the morality of contract resides in the
realm of justice to be governed by what Fried calls “law.”   In Fullerian terms,52
whereas the ethical duty to keep one’s promises is part of the private morality of
aspiration, the duty to adhere to one’s contractual commitments is part of the public
morality of duty and is a requirement of justice.  In his timely and worthwhile effort
to ground contract in morality, Fried made a category mistake by focusing on the
wrong moral construct.  And this mistake resulted in his inability to reconcile much
of the actual law of contract with the internal morality of contract.
CONCLUSION
Contract as Promise is a remarkable intellectual accomplishment for which
Professor Fried should be proud.  It made, and continues to make, a signal
contribution to our understanding of contract law.  For those who have accepted the
contract as promise model, Fried correctly identified the core of contractual
obligation.  For those who, like me, reject contract as promise, Fried’s contribution
is two-fold.  First, he stood astride the momentum among contracts theorists to reject
freedom of contract and collapse contract into tort and said “stop!”  And stop it did. 
Second, his clear explication of the model of contract as promise, along with his
candid admission of its limits, opened a theoretical space for a model of contractual
obligation that better comports with the distinction in morality between the right and
the good and that better explains and justifies the law of contract: contract as consent.
I examine the relationship between justice and the rule of law at length in RANDY E.52
BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW (1998).
